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Abstract 
 
This study explores two questions: first, what conceptual resources do students use, and in what 
ways do they use them, to construct explanatory models? Second, what are the obstacles 
preventing them from constructing a useful explanatory model? Our findings indicate that 
students employ their conscious and unconscious knowledge in their reasoning process. 
Connecting intuitive knowledge and abstract knowledge is important for students to construct 
coherent and sophisticated explanatory models. If students rely only on intuitive knowledge, they 
may construct a tentative and non-sophisticated explanatory model; however, if students rely 
only on verbal symbolic knowledge at an abstract level without connection with their intuition, 
they may not have the ability to construct an explanatory model. This research shows that 
instruction needs to help students connect their verbal symbolic knowledge and intuition to 
construct their own explanatory model to make sense of abstract scientific knowledge. 
 
Introduction 
 
To explore the use of analogies and models in the real-time thought processes of living scientists, 
Clement (1988, 1989) asked scientists to consider problems on their “personal frontier,” that is, 
problems for which they did not have ready-made theories or explanations. One such problem 
concerns the question of how “stretchy” a spring would be that is made of the same kind of wire 
but has twice the diameter of another spring. While all those interviewed made the initial (and 
correct) prediction that the wider spring would stretch more, when asked how they could 
increase their confidence they generated many analogies and models. One subject in particular 
exhibited several cycles of generation, critique, and modification of models that would help him 
explain, not just predict, the behavior of the spring. This behavior - generation, critique, and 
modification of explanatory models - is similar to processes in the history of science explored by 
philosophers and historians of science such as Black (1962), Hesse (1967) and Harre (1972).  
Models and analogies are now widely recognized as central in scientific thinking. 
 
Models and analogies are also recognized as central in learning science. Didactic use of 
analogies can help students map a well understood base structure to a less well understood target 
structure (Gentner, 1983; Glynn, 1994; Dagher, 1998; Duit, 1991). But while such didactic use 
of analogies is an important area of research, here we focus on student-initiated models and 
analogical reasoning with those models. Processes of model construction, critique, and revision 
have been shown to help students to make sense of initially counterintuitive ideas. Brown and 
Clement (1989; Brown, 1993, 1995) argue that explanatory models provide a means for students 
to refocus their intuitions by enriching target situations with unseen explanatory mechanisms. 
Clement and Steinberg (2002; Clement, 1989) show that a model construction cycle of 
generation, evaluation, and modification (GEM Cycles) prompts students’ conceptual growth in 
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science learning. Wong (1993a; 1993b) shows that spontaneous analogies students generated 
were helpful in explaining unfamiliar phenomenon related to air pressure. Just as model 
construction, critique, and revision is central to scientific advance, so it can be important in 
advancement of student understanding. 
 
In studying student understanding in science, it is important to use a modeling language that 
allows for the appropriate representation of the range of phenomena under consideration. In this 
case we needed a modeling language that allowed for the detailed representation of children’s 
conceptual thinking as they grappled with ideas and phenomena related to magnetism. One 
possible modeling language is that of early work on misconceptions and conceptual change 
(Driver & Easley, 1978; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Hewson & Hewson, 1984; 
McCloskey, 1983). From this perspective students’ conceptions are represented as theories 
similar to historical theories in science (e.g., impetus theory, phlogiston theory, etc.). There are 
several difficulties with this perspective for our purposes. First, when closely examined, 
students’ ideas often share some features of the historical theories, but not others. Second, 
historical proponents of these theories used them fairly consistently, which is typically not the 
case with students. Third, the common view of such “misconceptions” is that they are simply 
wrong. But a constructivist view of knowledge and learning would imply that the seeds of 
“correct” conceptions lie in these “misconceptions.” Fourth, this perspective focuses on 
conscious theories or propositions. In our work we often found that unarticulated, intuitive or 
“subconceptual” aspects seemed to be operating. 
 
Two more recent perspectives that attempt to deal with these issues are those of Vosniadou 
(1994, 2002) and diSessa (1988, 1993). While these perspectives are often cast as conflicting, 
Brown (1995b) and Brown and Hammer (to appear) argue that these perspectives are more 
similar than different. Both of these views focus on the gradual evolution of students’ 
conceptions (rather than all or nothing shifts), both of them focus on intuitive or subconceptual 
aspects (presuppositions for Vosniadou, phenomenological primitives or p-prims for diSessa), 
and both see students’ ideas as complex systems of interrelated elements rather than unitary 
wholes. This said, there are differences. Vosniadou tends to focus on the construction of 
conscious “synthetic models” from relatively stable subconceptual presuppositions, while 
diSessa tends to focus on comparatively less stable configurations of subconceptual p-prims. 
Brown (1993, 1995a, 1995b) proposes a framework that attempts to bring these perspectives 
together into a larger perspective that enables focus on subconceptual as well as conceptual 
aspects. The elements of this model include core intuitions, implicit models, conscious models 
(including explanatory models), and verbal-symbolic knowledge. This framework gave us a 
vocabulary for deeply analyzing the students’ conceptions.   
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Following are descriptions of the different elements of Brown’s framework for interpreting 
students’ conceptions. To illustrate each of the elements we employ examples from thinking 
about circuit electricity. 
 
Verbal-symbolic knowledge:  In this category are consciously remembered generalizations, 
such as “V=IR,” “electric current only flows when there is a complete circuit,” or “power is 
 3
energy per time.” While such generalizations are important and often powerful, it is typically 
how they are connected to conscious and implicit models and core intuitions that determines the 
sense that students make of them. 
 
Conscious models:  In this category are visual images of both observable elements (e.g., 
visualizing a battery connected to wires and light bulbs) and unobservable elements (visualizable 
models that explain why observable phenomena occur – these are called here “explanatory 
models”). An example of an explanatory model in circuit electricity might be visualization of 
unseen positive current flowing from the positive side of the battery and unseen negative current 
flowing from the negative side that meet at the bulb, interacting to produce light. Explanatory 
models typically involve unseen elements interacting in comparatively complex ways (as 
compared with implicit models below). 
 
Implicit models:  In this category are tacit or taken for granted aspects of models. For example, 
in the model of current flow, the current may be tacitly assumed to be like rainwater flowing in a 
gutter rather than water under pressure in a garden hose. Implicit models are taken for granted 
(rather than consciously employed, as are explanatory models) and they are comparatively 
simple, typically involving single elements rather than multiple interacting elements as with 
explanatory models. They differ from core intuitions in being domain specific rather than domain 
general. 
 
Core intuitions:  In this category are causal intuitions attached to elements of implicit or 
conscious models. In a subject's consideration of a situation, causal intuitions of agency or 
response become attached to elements of the situation. The particular configuration of causal 
intuitions forms what Brown (1993) calls an "attributive cluster." For example, when current 
causes a bulb to light, the current may be considered to be an initiating agent (with causal power 
of its own) and the bulb just to be affected by the current. If the situation is considered in a 
broader context, the battery may be considered to be the initiating agent with its own causal 
power, the current is then considered to have causal power that has been transmitted to it, and the 
light bulb is again affected by the current. If the subject's attention is drawn to the wire, this may 
be considered to be an inert object simply constraining the flow of the current. Thus we can see 
that in a given situation, several different attributive clusters may be instantiated depending on 
the focus of attention of the subject and what, at the moment, the subject considers salient.   
 
This multilevel framework allows for sophisticated analyses of students’ conceptions and 
changes in their conceptions as it allows for focus on both conscious and implicit elements of 
students’ thinking. This framework enabled us to address the following research questions. First, 
we explore how students involve different levels of knowledge to help themselves construct 
explanatory models by using this framework. We also investigate the interrelationships between 
conscious and unconscious knowledge that students employed to explore conditions under which 
students would develop useful or powerful explanatory models. Next, we also explored obstacles 
preventing students from constructing explanatory models. In order to answers these questions, 
we will examine the episodes in which they succeeded or failed to construct explanatory models 
in order to explore how they employed their conceptual resources and the interrelationships 
among the different levels of knowledge. 
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An important point needs to be made here. A “sophisticated” or “powerful” explanatory model is 
not necessarily the “correct” or “canonical” or “scientific” model. Students were not receiving 
any direct instruction in these interviews, and so it is not to be expected that they would 
spontaneously develop models that took many years, if not hundreds of years, to develop in the 
scientific community. However, we argue that students who are well developed in their abilities 
to construct, critique, and revise models will be in a good position to benefit from more directive 
instruction moving them toward canonical models. As such we view helping students to become 
better at constructing, critiquing, and revising models as having important content ramifications 
as well as ramifications for involving them in scientific processes and for helping them to 
consider the nature of science as centrally involving modeling. 
 
Design 
 
Participants 
 
The participants in this research were recruited from 3rd and 6th grade classes of a private 
Christian school. Five 3rd graders and three 6th graders with pseudonyms of Paula(6), Vivian(6), 
and Yong(6) participated in this research, but only three 3rd graders, Lily(3), Donna(3), and 
Kate(3) were included in the analysis to equalize the numbers between grades, to represent other 
third graders’ similar responses, and to exclude a student who was not able to concentrate on the 
tasks, hindering him from answering interview questions. 
 
 
Procedure 
 
This interview adopted a clinical interview approach (Clement, 2000). In order to explore 
students’ construction, critique, and revision of explanations, the interviewer (first author) 
employed a predict-observe-explain (POE) approach in the interviews. The interviewer asked 
students to make a prediction before they did the activities, to observe the phenomenon during 
the activity, and to explain the phenomenon during and after the activity. The questions were not 
standardized because the interviewer would adjust or alter the questions according to students’ 
varied responses in order to induce students to make predictions, observations, and explanations. 
 
The responsibility of the interviewer was to keep students on task, and to help students to focus 
on relevant phenomena that were employed by students to construct explanations. The other 
responsibility of the interviewer was to explore what students thought about magnetism when 
they played around with materials with less intervention. However, the interviewer’s exploratory 
questions or confrontational questions sometimes influenced how students answered the 
questions. During the process of clarifying their thinking, students may be aware of the 
inconsistency of their explanations. Or sometimes the interviewer would ask them to explain 
why they did not mention specific terms that they use in the previous explanation or activity.  
 
Every student was interviewed four times, except for Kate(3), who was interviewed only three 
times due to her time constraints. Interview times varied from 40 to 60 minutes. There were two 
or three activities in each interview. The names and sequence of the activities are as following 
Table 1. 
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Table 1   
The names and sequence of the activities. 
 
Interviews Activities 
M1: Pre-knowledge 
M2: Two Magnets 
First Interview 
M3: Donut Magnets 
M4: Paper Clip Second Interview 
M5: Metal Bars 
M6: Iron Filings over One Magnet Third Interview 
M7: Iron Filings over Two Magnets 
M8: Compass Fourth Interview 
M9: Final Review 
 
In M1: Pre-knowledge Interview, the students were asked their impression about magnets before 
playing with magnetic toys. Then, the students were asked to predict which among the toys in 
front of them were magnets and explain why they thought those toys were magnets. After 
playing with magnetic toys, the students then were asked to pick up the ones which are magnets 
and explain how and why magnets work. In M2: the two magnets activity, the students made a 
prediction before playing with two bar magnets, and created an explanation about the attraction 
and repulsion between two bar magnets after playing with them (see Figure 1). In M3: the donut 
magnets activity, the students made a prediction with an explanation before playing with two 
donut magnets put on a vertical stick, one on top of the other. Then, after playing with donut 
magnets, they were asked to explain how and why magnets work (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kate(3)’s drawing of her observation of the two magnets activity 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Paula(6)’s drawing of her observation of the donut magnets activity as the top magnet 
“floated” because of repulsion 
 
In M4: the paper clip activity, the students were asked to predict what would happen between a 
magnet and a paper clip tied to a piece of string (such that the paper clip is attached to the 
magnet but does not touch it), and then to observe and explain it. Then, they predicted what 
would happen when putting different materials, such as a piece of paper and different kinds of 
metal plates in the gap between the magnet and the paper clip. Then, after their observations, 
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they were asked to explain how the magnet works to attract the paper clip, and why some 
material would make the paper clip fall down, but other materials would not (see Figure 3). In 
M5: the metal bars activity, students predicted and explained the attraction of the different parts 
of the magnet to a metal bar. They gave further explanations after playing with the magnets and 
metal bars. Then they were asked to predict and explain how to use the metal bar to pick up the 
other metal bar. After further observation, they were asked to explain how the magnet can make 
metal bars connect to each other (see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Yong(6)’s drawing of his observation of the paper clip activity 
 
 
Figure 4. Vivian(6)’s drawing of her observation of the metal bars activity 
 
In M6: the iron filings over one magnet activity, the students were asked to predict what will 
happen to the iron filing on the plastic plate after putting a magnet under the plate. After 
observing what happened to the iron filings, they were asked to explain why the magnet would 
cause the particular pattern of iron filings (see Figure 5). In M7: the iron filings over two 
magnets activity, the students were asked to do the same thing with two unlike poles of two 
magnets and two like poles of two magnets (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 5. Paula(6)’s drawing of her observation of the iron filings over one magnet activity 
 
    
 
Figure 6. Paula(6)’s drawing of her observation of the iron filings over two magnets activity 
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In M8: the compass activity, the students were first asked if they knew how to use a compass. If 
they did not know how to use a compass, the interviewer would tell them how to read and use the 
compass. Then, the students were asked to predict and observe what would happen when they 
moved the compass around the magnet and moved the magnet around the compass. After that, 
they were asked to predict what would happen when they put several compasses around the 
magnet. Then, after observing the arrow of the compass, they were asked to give an explanation 
about how the magnet works to make compasses point in certain directions or form certain 
patterns (see Figure 7). In M9: the final review, the students were asked to review the pictures 
that they had drawn and the explanations that they had made in the previous activities. After that, 
they were asked to make a final explanation for how and why magnets work. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Paula(6)’s drawing of her observation of the compass activity 
 
 
Data Sources and Analysis 
 
Students were individually interviewed and videotaped in their school classroom or in a 
university classroom. Students’ verbal responses and non-verbal behavior were transcribed from 
the videotape, and students’ drawings were used to supplement and clarify students’ explanations. 
The microanalysis of students’ conceptions was coded using Brown’s framework to analyze how 
students change their conceptions, with internal agreement between two researchers. 
 
In this framework, the categories of core intuitions and implicit models helped with analyzing 
students’ unconscious, intuitive levels of knowledge, and the categories of verbal-symbolic 
knowledge and conscious models helped with analyzing students’ conscious levels of knowledge. 
Brown’s framework also helped investigate how core intuitions and implicit models can be 
involved in the conscious levels of knowledge.  
 
Brown (1993) hypothesizes that explanatory models help students make intuitive connections by 
providing images that help students attribute agency in different ways. For example, many 
students view a table as inert and therefore unable to exert a force on a book resting on it.  
However, after helping the student see the table as microscopically springy, it now makes sense 
to many students that the table would exert an upward force, just as a spring will push on your 
hand if you press on it. The unseen attribute of springiness in the table has helped the students 
view the table as having “reactive agency.” The core intuitions attach to the conscious and taken 
for granted images (that is, conscious and implicit models) of situations, and so helping students 
to image the situations differently may help them re-focus their core intuitions, allowing for 
conceptual change at an intuitive level. 
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Figure 8 shows the core intuitions that came into play in these analyses. An initiating agent is 
seen as having its own agency to act on other entities. An initiated agent has agency to act that 
has been transferred to it from another agent. An affected responder is influenced by another 
entity’s agency. An instrumental responder conveys agency from another agent, and an inert 
responder is not affected by agency, it simply provides a constraint or obstacle (Brown, 1993, 
1995a). These elemental core intuitions combine into “attributive clusters” as the perceived 
agency of different entities interacting in a situation. 
 
  
 
 
  Initiating agent    Initiated agent     
 
 
 
Instrumental responder  Inert responder    Affected responder 
 
Figure 8. Brown’s diagram (1993, 1995a) of representation of attributive cluster 
 
Consider an example from this study to illustrate the meaning of attribution agency. One of 
Donna(3)’s explanations about magnetism, as interpreted from attribution of agency, is that the 
magnet is the initiating agent to send out magnetic force as the initiated agent to attract the paper 
clip as the affected responder. The other example from Paula(6) is that the magnet is the 
initiating agent to send out electricity as the initiated agent to go through the finger as the 
instrumental responder to reach the other magnet as the affected responder. 
 
The thin paper is the inert responder in Donna(3)’s explanation, because Donna(3) thinks that 
thin paper is too thin to cut off the magnetic force, whereas to Paula(6) the finger is the 
instrumental responder, because she thought that she could feel the electricity going through her 
finger to attract the other magnet. The two examples of attributive cluster are in Figure 9. 
 
 
     
 
 
Magnet—magnetic force—thin paper—paper clip 
Initiating agent—initiated agent—inert responder—affected responder 
 
  
 
Magnet—electricity—finger—magnet 
Initiating agent—initiated agent—Instrumental responder—affected responder 
 
Figure 9. Representation of attributive clusters about how magnets attract a paper clip or another 
magnet 
 
Results 
* 
* 
* 
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When students constructed a useful explanatory model, they always involved implicit models 
and core intuitions in their explanatory models, which include how they perceive the nature of 
the world and the casual relationships of interacting entities. Sometimes they also employed 
verbal symbolic knowledge in their explanations; however, this element was not necessarily 
involved in constructing explanatory models. 
 
Paula(6), a sixth grader, was the only student able to consistently integrate her intuitive and 
conscious knowledge in order to construct coherent and sophisticated explanatory models. She 
exhibited meta-conceptual awareness during the process of developing her explanatory models 
by explicitly critiquing and revising her models. By contrast, the third graders seemed to be 
“captured” by their intuitive knowledge—they were able to construct explanatory models in 
several cases, but in a new context they tended to simply discard the old model and either rely 
directly on their intuitive knowledge or construct a new explanatory model based on their current 
view of the situation, rather than striving for consistency by critiquing and revising an earlier 
model. The other two sixth graders seemed to be “captured” by their verbal symbolic knowledge, 
showing little tendency to even construct a model, let alone critique and revise one. 
 
In the beginning of the interview, most students who employed their intuition to construct 
explanations in their following interviews started with a very simple explanation based on their 
initial “intuitive take.” For example, Lily(3), Donna(3), Kate(3), and Paula(6) started with the 
explanations that magnets work because of something inside the magnets, such as metal, special 
lead, black metal powder, or negatives and positives, as initiating agent to act on the other 
objects. On the other hand, other students, such as Yong(6) and Vivian(6), who mainly employed 
verbal symbolic knowledge in their explanations, started their explanations with some 
terminology, such as magnetic field, magnetic material, or invisible forces of gravity or 
electricity, which they thought could be related to magnetism. However, how they developed 
their conceptions were different in the following interviews.  
 
In what follows we use Paula(6) as a model for the comparison with the other five students in 
order to explore what conceptual resources they used when they constructed explanatory models, 
and what obstacles prevented them from constructing an explanatory model. The following are 
some findings from the six case studies. 
 
How Different Levels of Knowledge Helped Students Construct Explanatory Models 
 
Associating verbal symbolic knowledge with intuitions or using only intuitions.  There were two 
different ways in which students constructed their explanatory models. The first was that 
students constructed their explanatory models by associating their verbal symbolic knowledge 
with intuitions, as Paula(6) did. The second is that students constructed their explanatory models 
by using only their intuitions, as Donna(3), Lily(3), and Kate(3) did. 
 
When Paula(6) connected her verbal symbolic knowledge about the positives and negatives of 
the magnet with her core intuitions—positives or negatives as initiating agents to act on the other 
positives or negatives of the magnets—and the implicit models about the nature of magnetism, 
such as substance-like magnetism, she began to construct her “electricity view” explanatory 
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model. During the process of refining her explanatory model, she still connected her verbal 
symbolic knowledge with her intuitions in her “electricity view” while adding some new features 
into her explanations, such as the positives and negatives on the paper clip and iron filings, or the 
bubble shape of magnetic fields (see Figure 10).  
 
 
 
                                                         
                                                         
 
Positives or negatives—electricity—positives or negatives 
      of paper clip                of magnet 
 
Figure 10. Paula(6)’s drawing and attributive cluster about how a magnet attracts a paper clip 
when there is a piece of paper between the magnet and paper clip. This picture shows the 
positives and negatives on the magnet and the paper clip, and the bubble shape of the magnetic 
field. 
 
Other students who had constructed more than one explanatory model in their explanations also 
involved core intuitions and implicit models in their reasoning, but they seldom involved verbal 
symbolic knowledge in their explanatory models. For example, Lily(3)’s explanatory model was 
that magnet-like materials travel from the magnet to the metal bars, making them stick in a chain 
(see Figure 11). Lily(3) appeared to use her intuitions that the moving materials in the magnet 
acted as initiating agents to act on other metal bars, and that the moving of the materials enabled 
the magnet to stick to other metal bars. She did not employ verbal symbolic knowledge to 
construct her explanatory model, even though she had mentioned some verbal symbolic 
knowledge from her mother in the previous interview: “I think my mom once told me that about 
the North side and South side, and that, when they’re the same, you can’t get them together. And, 
but when they’re touching…” Moreover, this explanatory model that Lily(3) constructed by 
using her intuitions only was maintained for only a short time and was not applied to other 
contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Magnet—Metal bar—the other metal bar 
 
Figure 11. Representation of Lily(3)’s explanation about how things go through the magnet and 
metal bars to make them attract 
*
＊
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Donna(3) and Kate(3), also constructed unstable explanatory models. Donna(3)’s explanatory 
model was that if the “special leads” in the magnets face each other, gravity would pull them 
together, but if the special lead and the ordinary lead face each other, gravity would push them 
apart. The use of the term “gravity” might imply the use of verbal symbolic knowledge, but 
Donna(3) seemed to be using this term simply to indicate a kind of vague initiating agency. 
Kate(3)’s explanatory model was that the black powder moves to two ends of the magnet and the 
power travels from the magnet to the metal bars. None of them utilized the verbal symbolic 
knowledge they had mentioned to construct explanatory models, nor did they apply their 
explanatory models consistently to the different contexts. 
 
Therefore, employing only core intuitions and implicit models enabled students to construct 
explanatory models, but the explanatory models that they constructed were rather tentative, and 
they did not apply the same explanatory models in other contexts. They seemed to be “at the 
mercy” of their intuitive knowledge. 
 
Using verbal symbolic knowledge to overcome implicit models.  The other observed role of 
verbal symbolic knowledge was to help students overcome their inappropriate implicit models, 
helping them to construct more sophisticated explanatory models. In the donut magnet activity, 
Paula(6), Donna(3), and Lily(3) mentioned that the same sides of the magnets stick together and 
that opposite ends of the magnets push away. Their conceptions were strongly influenced by 
their implicit model that same things stick together. The implicit model became stronger here 
because there was no symbol on the donut magnets to help students identify the different sides of 
the magnets. However, after the confirmation of the relationships between the different ends of 
the two magnets from the interviewer, Paula(6) shifted back to her “electricity view” by 
reconsidering the relationship between negatives and positives, whereas Donna(3) and Lily(3) 
still maintained their notion that same things stick together. 
 
Yet, in the review of the two magnets activity, Donna(3) shifted from her view that different 
leads would push each other away to a new view that different leads would pull together by 
employing the symbols on the magnets to overcome her implicit model. She referred to the N 
and S symbol on the magnets, so she thought that different symbols represent different leads, so 
she changed her explanations to the view that different leads go together. While Lily(3) had 
mentioned her verbal symbolic knowledge from her mother about the attraction between N-S and 
the repulsion between N-N and S-S, she only involved the verbal symbolic knowledge into her 
explanation that if the same sides of the magnet face each other, they would push away and vice 
versa, but she did not further develop her explanation from this verbal symbolic knowledge. She 
was strongly influenced by her implicit model—that same things stick together—in the rest of 
the activities. 
 
In the comparison of these three cases, it appeared that students have different levels of 
proficiency in utilizing their verbal symbolic knowledge. Paula(6) seemed to have better skill to 
utilize her verbal symbolic knowledge to enable her to overcome her inappropriate implicit 
model. Donna(3) did not utilize her verbal symbolic knowledge to help her overcome her 
implicit model during the most of interviews until the final review of two magnets activity. 
Lily(3) did not seem to be proficient in using her verbal symbolic knowledge. When she used her 
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implicit model to construct explanations, she did not involve her verbal symbolic knowledge in 
her reasoning.  
 
Borrowing verbal symbolic knowledge from other domains.  Another reason why Paula(6) 
succeeded in constructing a coherent and sophisticated explanatory model is that Paula(6) 
projected the notions of the other domain, electricity, with which she was more familiar, to 
magnetism, with which she was unfamiliar. She used the attraction between negatives and 
positives and the repulsion between negatives and negatives or positives and positives in the 
magnet to explain the attraction and repulsion between two magnets. Paula(6) did not abstractly 
apply the conceptions of positives and negatives to explain magnetism, compared with Donna(3) 
who used the terms, positives and negative to represent the North and South ends of the magnets. 
Paula(6) speculated that the negatives and positives are electron or particle like inside the magnet, 
and they are the initiating agent to cause the attraction and repulsion.  
 
Furthermore, after reviewing all of the activities that she had done, Paula(6) shifted from the 
“bubble view of electricity” to the “wave view of electricity.” She projected the notion of wave 
currents in the sea to the “positives and negatives view” to explain how the waves of the 
magnetism from the earth could travel for a long distance to affect the compass. Following is her 
statement to explain why and how she modified her explanations:  
 
I thought of it as having more of a bubble around it, because when you are in... Like when 
you are learning about the solar system, you learn that earth has a magnetic field around it. 
It’s basically in the shape of a bubble…. So it looks like a bubble so you think of it of 
course as a bubble. So that’s where I got this theory. Now that I think of it, they are more 
like waves. Because of the compasses, they will be pulled by waves. And there are waves 
from, like, even from, you know—the North is many, many, many miles that way and since 
the North cannot have a bubble. Well it kind of does already all around it and right here it 
probably would have waves coming off it. And that’s also what creates wave currents in 
the sea. 
 
Despite the fact that the way she used a wave view to equate electricity and magnetism is not the 
way that scientists explain magnetism, applying a sophisticated explanatory model from one 
domain to the other indeed helped her to make sense of magnetism—a concept with which she 
was not familiar before. The wave notion is regarded as a more abstract and less tangible 
conception than other notions, which can be intuitively perceived from daily life experience 
(Bube, 1992). Thus, employing verbal symbolic knowledge about ocean waves enabled Paula(6) 
to develop her bubble view of magnetic fields to into a more abstract wave view of magnetic 
fields. 
 
Besides Paula(6), other students also mentioned some verbal symbolic knowledge from other 
domains, but the verbal symbolic knowledge did not help them successfully construct 
explanatory models. For example, Yong(6) seemed to use verbal symbolic knowledge from a 
domain he was more familiar with as an analogy to magnetism. He used the passing of germs as 
an analogy to describe how gravity, electricity, and forces traveled through the magnet and metal 
bars. He also used an analogy regarding the two sexes to explain the attraction and repulsion 
between two magnets. Yong(6)’s self-generated analogies helped him to explain an unfamiliar 
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domain, but they did not help him to construct an explanatory model, because he did not 
associate his verbal-symbolic knowledge with his core intuitions, as Paula(6) did.  
 
Brown (1993) proposed that analogies can help students construct more abstract concepts so as 
to promote students’ conceptual change. The role of analogy in conceptual change is to “help 
enrich or further concretize representations of specific situations with concrete objects or 
properties that fruitfully engaged intuitions about the situations” (p.1273). This creates a bridge 
between anchor conceptions and target conceptions. Wong (1993a; 1993b) also claimed that 
students’ self generated analogies help them to explain the unfamiliar phenomena.  
 
Obstacles Preventing Students from Constructing Explanatory Models 
 
Applying verbal symbolic knowledge abstractly.  Although some of the students applied verbal 
symbolic knowledge in their reasoning, they did not construct explanatory models in the way 
Paula(6) did. Apparently the reason why the other students could not construct coherent and 
sophisticated explanatory models is that they applied their verbal symbolic knowledge abstractly, 
without connection with their intuitions. They tried to use their existing verbal symbolic 
knowledge to respond to different phenomena of magnetism in different activities without trying 
to associate it with their intuition in order to construct explanatory models. For example, Yong(6) 
is a student who deployed verbal symbolic knowledge at an abstract level; therefore, all of his 
explanations revolved around the notion that gravity, electricity or magnetic forces would cause 
the attraction of the magnets. In the metal bar activity, he stated how the analogy of passing 
germs was applied to explain the magnetic force: 
 
It’s part…the germ was the electricity. The electricity will hold how much it can. They 
are made of magnetic and they have gravity powers that the magnet can’t… So the 
magnet will try to hold it by using it’s ability, but some of them, when they are magnetic, 
the ability will stick and make the magnet stick. 
 
He also stated the similarity and difference between these magnetic force, electricity, and 
gravity: 
 
Magnetic force and gravity are kind of different. But I believe that’s how the magnet 
works…some people say it works by gravity. Some people say it works by electricity. 
Some people say it works by force. It just…those three are possible in how the magnet 
works. I just don’t know for sure. 
 
The gravity, it pulls anything. It’s like a force. Like Star Wars, like Jedi, using the force 
to pull anything, or push something. It could be like force. Or those kind of force is like 
gravity. It can pull anything like Earth, or push like the gravity is gone. It could be like 
that. I think that the gravity would be more like how the magnet works. Well, also 
electricity. Because it’s like they’re pulling something. 
 
He recognized that there were differences between electricity, gravity, and magnetic forces, but 
nonetheless believed that they worked the same way. However, presenting all of the verbal 
symbolic knowledge that he remembered did not help him to construct an explanatory model. 
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The reason why he persisted in using verbal symbolic knowledge may have been that he was a 
student who seemed most to assume there were correct scientific answers to the questions, so 
when facing a difficulty in answering how and why magnets work, he responded, “I don’t get the 
facts. I don’t get the answer.” or “I don’t know quite sure. That is why I cannot answer.” 
 
In comparing how Paula(6) employed her verbal symbolic knowledge with Donna(3), both of 
them employed verbal symbolic knowledge about the positives and negatives of the magnet. 
However, Paula(6) associated positives and negatives with the initiating agent of magnetism, but 
Donna(3) only applied positives and negatives as the N and S symbols of the magnet to identify 
different sides of the magnet, without any connection with her core intuitions.  
 
Compared with Vivian(6), Paula(6) also mentioned verbal symbolic knowledge about magnetic 
fields, but she only used them to describe the ranges that magnets can affect. Furthermore, 
Paula(6) projected other verbal symbolic knowledge, such as negatives and positives from 
electricity, to explain how magnets work, rather than employing abstract conceptions of 
magnetic fields. Vivian(6) held a “magnetic field view”—that the magnetic force from the 
magnet acts on other matter—as her main explanation for how magnets work in different 
contexts. Vivian(6) used the term “magnetic field” to substitute for the invisible “magnetic 
force” that she had mentioned. Vivian(6) did connect the term magnetic field with her intuitions, 
but directly with core intuitions. In other words, to her “magnetic field” was just another term for 
the direct agency of the magnet. Comparing the two cases, we can find that Vivian(6)’s idea was 
similar to the canonical explanation about magnetic fields, but she did not really “own” this 
explanatory model. The conception of a magnetic field did not help her to construct her own 
explanatory model. 
 
Only connecting verbal symbolic knowledge with implicit models.  Although Paula(6) is 
exemplary in showing how a student can develop explanatory models, in the compass activity 
Paula(6) did not seem to further construct or refine her explanatory model. Her reasoning seemed 
to be confined by her implicit model and verbal symbolic knowledge, so she did not construct a 
further explanatory model. For instance, in the compass activity, Paula(6) vacillated between two 
notions. One was the implicit model that the arrow of the compass should point to positive. The 
other represented her combining of verbal symbolic knowledge that compasses points to North, 
and an implicit model that up is positive. Therefore, Paula(6) reasoned abstractly in the compass 
activity, rather than constructing or refining a useful explanatory model. 
 
Only connecting verbal symbolic knowledge with implicit models also inhibited Kate(3) from 
constructing an explanatory model. When explaining the attraction and repulsion between two 
magnets, Kate(3) would associate her verbal symbolic knowledge about the different directions 
of the classroom with the N and S symbol on the magnet to decide whether the magnet went to 
the right or wrong direction. She also involved an implicit model that if two magnets went to the 
right direction, they would stick; if one of them went to the wrong direction, they would repel. 
Only using verbal symbolic knowledge and implicit models in her reasoning, Kate(3)’s 
explanation still stayed at an abstract level, instead of constructing a visualized explanatory 
model. 
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Overly relying on implicit models.  Implicit models seemed to help students make sense of the 
phenomena that they could not explain, but they by themselves they did not help students to 
construct explanatory models. The explanatory models indeed contained implicit models, but if 
students overly relied on implicit models, they would fail to construct an explanatory model.  
 
In Paula(6)’s explanatory model, she indeed involved her implicit models to help her reasoning, 
such as the idea of electricity as an extra link or extension of the magnet, which represented a 
substance-like magnetism, after she asserted that she could feel the pressure of her finger 
between two magnets. However, after she constructed this explanatory model of “electricity 
view”, she did not mention the substance-like magnetism in the following activities. In the final 
section of interview, from her explanations, electricity became a wave-like energy without the 
property of a substance. Paula(6) thought that there are waves inside and outside of the magnet. 
The waves would come off the magnet and are made of positives and negatives electricity in her 
“electricity view.” Therefore, Paula(6) did not appear to over rely on her implicit model. She 
progressed from her intuition, substance-like magnetism, to a more abstract notion, wave-like 
magnetism (see Figure 12). 
 
 
 
 
Positives and negatives—Waves—Positives and negatives 
    of magnet                 of other material or magnet 
 
Figure 12. Representation of Paula(6)’s drawing and explanation about “wave view” 
 
On the other hand, Lily(3) used a “sameness view”—that same things stick together—from her 
implicit model to explain most of the phenomena in the activities. Thus, she failed to construct 
an explanatory model from her “sameness view.” In actuality, Lily(3), Donna(3), and Paula(6) 
had similar notions while playing with the donut magnet. In the donut magnet activity, Donna(3) 
appeared changed from her originally idea that “special leads facing each other would repel” to 
that of a “modified special lead view”—“special lead facing each other would attract” in one 
statement. 
 
[3  0:24:56]. 
(3.14) I: So what’s going on (pointing to gap between top two magnets) between these 
two magnets? 
(3.14) D: There’s a magnetic force that’s not letting it connect with each other. Uh, I 
guess just there’s gravity and special lead. The special lead inside the 
magnets… there’s special lead on one of the sides, I guess, and if the special 
*
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lead isn’t facing, like, then it will go together, if the special leads are facing 
each other, but if the special leads facing each other (takes magnets off 
chopstick and puts opposite sides together so they stick), that will go together 
but, if the special leads are facing each other it will go together, but if the 
specials leads aren’t… (Reverses one of the magnets and puts on chopstick.) If 
the special leads aren’t facing each other there will be something between it that 
will make it not go together. But if the special leads are facing each other, then 
it will go together. 
 
In the donut magnets activity, Donna(3)’s implicit model—the same things stick together so two 
special leads facing each other stick together—overcame her original reasoning in the two 
magnets activity that two special leads push each other away 
 
Paula(6) also happened to apply “sameness view” in her prediction and observation of what 
happened between the two donut magnets for a short moment. Paula(6) mentioned, “If one side 
was positive and one side was negative, they would repel each other.” This statement was 
contrary to her previous statement that positives and negatives would attract, so she was asked to 
further clarified her meaning: “I'm guessing probably if they are opposite (they) would probably 
repel about here.” “If they are sort of opposite, they don’t like each other. They will push away 
and then they will be hovering here.” Therefore, the interviewer asked her again whether her 
meaning was that positives and positives would repel or positive and negatives would repel. This 
time Paula(6) changed her answers to positive and positive would repel. 
 
Therefore, from the above episode we found that due to lack of the N and S south symbols on the 
magnet to assist students to identify different sides of the, all of these three students used 
“sameness view” in the donut magnet activity. However, only Lily(3) depended too heavily on 
her implicit models to make explanations throughout the following interviews. Donna(3) and 
Paula(6) only showed their implicit model of “sameness view” in donut magnet activity. They 
dropped this explanations in other activities. Hence, overly replying on implicit model maybe 
prohibited Lily(3) from constructing explanatory models. 
 
Over-reliance on implicit models also made the explanatory models become conceptually fragile. 
Lily(3) only constructed an explanatory model for a short time in the metal bar activity. When 
she faced a problem that the metal bars originally did not stick to each other, she developed an 
explanatory model that something comes from the magnet to go through the metal bars. However, 
when she faced the challenge that she could not see material going through the magnet and metal 
bars, she fell back to using her “sameness view” to explain why the magnets would attract the 
metal bars in a chain, and resolved the previous conflict about why the metal bar did not attract 
the other metal bar with another core intuition—that metal bars are too small, so that they are not 
strong enough to stick to each other as a bigger magnet did. In a word, over-reliance on implicit 
models for explanation made Lily(3) feel no need to construct an explanatory model, and her 
implicit model also made her new constructed explanatory model become conceptually fragile. 
 
The way to employ core intuition.  Employing core intuitions to explain the microscopic 
structure of magnets or other materials can help students to construct explanatory models. For 
example, Paula(6) mentioned that more positives or negatives of one iron filing would decide in 
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which direction the iron filing would move. Kate(3) also mentioned that moving black powders 
to the two ends of the magnet to send out power from the magnet to the metal bars. Here, core 
intuitions seemed to be a foundation to help students to construct explanatory models. 
 
On the other hand, sometimes the ways students implicitly employed the causal relationships of 
core intuitions may have inhibited them from constructing further explanations. For example, 
Donna(3), Yong(6), Vivian(6), and Lily(3) used the core intuition—more agency leads to more 
effect—to explain why two ends of a magnet would pull more iron filings (this is essentially 
diSessa’s “Ohm’s p-prim,” a domain independent and central p-prim in diSessa’s framework). In 
another case, Vivian(6) used another core intuition relationship—that stronger things can 
overcome weaker things--to illustrate that because the magnetic field is stronger than a finger, so 
the magnet can attract a paper clip, even when putting a finger in between. The results showed 
that when students applied these core intuitions directly to the situations, it seemed to inhibit 
them from feeling the need to further construct explanatory models to explain the microscopic 
processes of magnetism.  
 
Anthropomorphic models may hinder students from constructing explanatory models.  Some 
students may use intuitive anthropomorphisms to make sense of the abstract conception of 
magnetism, thus failing to construct an explanatory model. For example, Kate(3) used intuitive 
notions, like “the paper clip can feel the magnet,” “they (metal bars) can’t feel the middle (of the 
magnet),” or “paper clip wants to get on to the magnet” to explain magnetism. Vivian(6) used 
verbal symbolic knowledge about magnetic fields or forces to explain why magnets work, but in 
the donut magnet activity, she used anthropomorphism to explain the repulsion between two 
magnets: “They are both trying to repel each other, because obviously, they don’t like each 
other.” Using this intuitive response seemed to impede students from feeling a need to construct 
an explanatory model. 
 
Interestingly, Paula(6) also involved intuitive anthropomorphisms in her brainstorming stage, 
stating that if two of the similar ends of the magnet do not like each other, they would push away, 
and if two opposite ends of the magnet like each other, they would go together. However, later in 
her explanations, Paula(6) shifted to using electricity to explain the attraction between two 
magnets, and thus started to construct an explanatory model. However, it is unclear why and how 
she dropped her intuitive anthropomorphic thinking. 
 
Conclusions 
 
From the analysis of six case studies, we found that connecting intuitive knowledge and verbal 
symbolic knowledge helped students to construct more coherent and sophisticated explanatory 
models. Paula(6) exemplified how to integrate abstract and intuitive knowledge to construct 
explanatory models. There were some students—Yong(6) and Vivian(6)—who also possessed 
verbal symbolic knowledge related to magnetism, but it appeared that they only applied intuitive 
knowledge in some contexts and applied verbal symbolic knowledge in other contexts. They did 
not make sense of the abstract verbal symbolic knowledge by using their intuition, nor did they 
connect these two to construct explanatory models. On the other hand, other students, including 
Donna(3), Lily(3), and Kate(3), employed their intuitive knowledge to construct one or several 
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explanatory models in several contexts. However, their explanatory models were fragile, and 
without either coherence or sophistication. 
 
In this study we observed that there was a disconnect between verbal symbolic knowledge of 
magnetism (from schooling, parents, books, etc.) and students’ intuitive knowledge. Students 
seemed to have problems connecting these two spontaneously, choosing either intuitive or 
verbal-symbolic knowledge to explain the phenomenon of magnetism. An important implication 
is that we need to teach students how to connect their abstract and intuitive knowledge to form 
their own explanatory models. 
 
 
 
 19
References 
 
Black, M. (1962). Models and archetypes. In M. Black, Models and metaphors (pp. 219-243). 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press). 
 
Brown, D. E. (1993).Refocusing core intuitions: A concretizing role for analogy in conceptual 
change. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30 (10), 1273-1290. 
 
Brown, D E. (1995a, April). Concrete focusing on re-focusing: A cross-domain perspective on 
conceptual change in mechanics and electricity. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Brown, D. E. (1995b, April). Theories in pieces? The nature of students’ conceptions and 
current issues in science education. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National 
Association for Research in Science Teaching, APRIL 22-25, San Francisco, CA. 
 
Brown, D., and Clement, J. (1989). Overcoming misconceptions via analogical reasoning: 
Factors influencing understanding in a teaching experiment. Instructional Science, 18, 
237-261. 
 
Brown, D. E., & Hammer, D. (to appear). Conceptual change in physics. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.), 
Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Bube, R. H. (1992). Electrons in solids: An introductory survey. Boston, MA: Academic Press. 
 
Clement, J. (1988). Observed methods for generating analogies in scientific problem solving. 
Cognitive Science, 12(4), 563-586. 
 
Clement, J. (1989). Learning via model construction and criticism: Protocol evidence on sources 
of creativity in science. In Glover, J., Ronning, R., and Reynolds, C. (Eds.), Handbook of 
creativity: Assessment, theory and research (pp. 341-381). NY: Plenum. 
 
Clement, J. (2000) Analysis of clinical interviews: Foundations and model viability. In Lesh, R. 
and Kelly, A (Eds.), Handbook of research methodologies for science and mathematics 
education (pp. 547-589). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Clement, J. and Steinberg, M. (2002) Step-wise evolution of models of electric circuits: A 
"learning-aloud" case study. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 11(4), 389-452. 
 
Dagher, Z. (1998). The case for analogies in teaching science for understanding. In J. Mintzes, 
Wandersee, J., Novak, J. (Ed.), Teaching science for understanding (pp. 195-211). San 
Diego: Academic Press. 
 
Duit, R. (1991). On the role of analogies and metaphors in learning science. Science Education, 
75, 649-672. 
 
 20
diSessa, A. A. (1988). Knowledge in pieces. In G. Forman and P. Pufall (Eds.), Constructivism 
in the computer age. (pp. 49-70). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
diSessa, A. A. (1993). Toward an epistemology of physics. Cognition and Instruction, 10 (2/3), 
105-225. 
 
Driver, R. & Easley, J. (1978). Pupils and paradigms: A review of literature related to concept 
development in adolescent science students. Studies in Science Education, 5, 61-84. 
 
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 
7, 155-170. 
 
Glynn, S. M. (1994). Teaching science with analogies: A strategy for teachers and textbook 
authors. Technical Report 15, National Reading Research Center. 
 
Harre, R. (1972). The philosophies of science. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hesse, M. B. (1967). Models and analogies in science. In Edwards, P. (Ed.), The encyclopedia of 
philosophy, (pp. 354-359). Free Press. 
 
Hewson, P. W., & Hewson, M. G. (1984). The role of conceptual conflict in conceptual change 
and the design of instruction. Instructional Science, 13(1), 1-13. 
 
McCloskey, M. (1983). Intuitive physics. Scientific American, 248 (4), 122-130. 
 
Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A. Hewson, P. W. & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a 
scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66 (2), 
211-227. 
 
Vosniadou, S. (1994). Capturing and modeling the process of conceptual change. Learning and 
Instruction 4, 45-69. 
 
Vosniadou, S. (2002). On the nature of naive physics. In M. Limon & L. Mason (Eds.), 
"Reconsidering conceptual change: Issues in theory and practice" (pp. 61-76). Dordrecht: 
Kluwer. 
 
Wong, E. D. (1993a). Understanding the generative capacity of analogies as a tool for 
explanation. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30(10), 1259-1272. 
 
Wong, E. D. (1993b). Self-generated analogies as a tool for constructing and evaluating 
explanations of scientific phenomena. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30(4), 
367-380. 
 
 
 
